DeFlock Metro Detroit is working for the complete removal and nonrenewal of networked automated license plate reader systems and materially similar mass vehicle-tracking technology.
We understand that many police officers, investigators and public-safety professionals see these systems differently.
Some have used them in real investigations. Some believe they save time. Some have recovered stolen vehicles or developed leads with them. Some genuinely believe the benefits outweigh the privacy concerns.
We can acknowledge all of that and still disagree with the policy.
Police should be heard—and the public should receive evidence.
Police and investigators have direct experience with these systems. Their perspective belongs in the discussion.
So do specific oversight questions: what crimes were materially aided, how often alerts were useful, how many false or stale alerts occurred, how searches and sharing were audited, what the program costs and what capability would actually be lost if the contract ended.
That is not exclusion. It is the same evidence-based review communities should apply to any consequential public-safety purchase.
This is not an anti-police campaign.
We are not arguing that police should not investigate crimes, technology has no place in policing, officers should work without useful tools, or every person who uses an ALPR system is doing something wrong.
Our concern is narrower:
Should government routinely collect searchable location information about ordinary people who are not suspected of committing a crime?
Our answer is no.
You do not have to be acting in bad faith for us to oppose the system.
A police chief can sincerely believe Flock is useful.
A detective can use it according to policy.
A patrol officer can respond appropriately to an alert.
A council member can vote for it because they believe it will improve public safety.
None of that resolves the larger policy question.
Good people can support a system we believe creates too much surveillance power. We can challenge that system without accusing everyone involved of bad motives.
We want to understand the strongest case for keeping it.
If your department believes an ALPR network is essential, tell us why.
Useful information includes:
- what problem it solves;
- how often it is used;
- which capabilities matter most;
- local cases where it materially changed the outcome;
- what investigators used before the system existed;
- what would become significantly harder without it;
- what safeguards are actually used;
- and how the department evaluates mistakes or misuse.
We would rather understand the real argument than knock down a weaker version of it.
We may still disagree after hearing it.
That is okay.
A department may conclude: This is an extremely useful investigative tool.
Residents may conclude: We understand the benefit and still do not want government routinely collecting this information about everybody.
Both statements can exist at the same time.
The final decision belongs in the normal democratic process.
Officers are residents too.
Police officers drive these roads, have families, visit doctors, attend religious services, have political beliefs, see friends, go to counseling, visit attorneys and live private lives.
The privacy principles involved here are not protections for other people.
They apply to everybody.
A surveillance system powerful enough to track someone you are investigating is also capable of recording observations involving officers and their families.
Misuse cases are not accusations against every officer.
When we discuss documented cases where an authorized user allegedly or improperly searched for a former partner, romantic interest, private individual or another person for an unauthorized reason, we are not claiming this is what police normally do.
We are showing something simpler:
The capability can be misused.
Security policy should account for what a system makes possible, not only what responsible users intend to do.
Strong safeguards are good.
If a department operates one of these systems, we would rather see tight access control, individual accounts, meaningful search reasons, regular audit review, clear discipline for misuse, careful sharing restrictions, shorter retention, verification before enforcement action and transparent public policies than the opposite.
Those safeguards can reduce harm.
We support making an existing system safer while it remains in operation.
That does not change our long-term position.
Our goal is still removal.
Auditability also protects officers.
Good audit records can protect legitimate users as well as expose improper ones.
If someone alleges an officer searched them improperly, a reliable audit trail can show what actually happened.
Accountability is not automatically hostile to police. It can protect everybody involved.
Verification protects officers too.
A bad automated hit can create a dangerous situation very quickly.
An officer responding to a stolen-vehicle alert may reasonably believe they are approaching a serious risk.
If the underlying plate was misread or the database information was wrong, both the officer and the innocent driver have been put into a situation neither should have faced.
That is why verification matters.
Machine confidence should not become human certainty without checking the evidence.
We are interested in how the system works in practice.
Policies tell us one thing. Real users can often explain something else.
For example:
- What happens when a plate is unclear?
- How are alerts displayed?
- What information accompanies the alert?
- What does an officer do before initiating a stop?
- Which features are actually useful?
- Which features rarely get used?
- What produces false leads?
- What frustrates investigators?
Those practical details matter when residents evaluate the technology.
“It saves time” is a real benefit.
Efficiency matters. Investigators have limited time.
A tool that quickly identifies a relevant vehicle may help move an investigation forward.
We do not dismiss that.
But government convenience is not the only value involved.
A free society deliberately places friction around some government powers. Warrants take time. Documentation takes time. Approval processes take time.
Those safeguards exist because efficiency and liberty sometimes pull in different directions.
The existence of a faster method does not automatically mean government should use it on everyone.
Help us distinguish what is real from what is marketing.
Vendor presentations can make technology sound almost magical.
Police users may have a much more practical view.
If Flock says a capability is revolutionary but investigators barely use it, that matters.
If a capability sounds alarming in marketing material but local configuration does not include it, that matters too.
And if local officers are using a capability residents do not know exists, that matters.
Accurate information makes the public debate better.
We will not knowingly misrepresent your department.
If we publish an outdated camera count, incorrect contract term, capability your department does not actually have, inaccurate description of policy or another material factual mistake, send us the better record.
We will review it.
Our opposition to the system does not require inaccurate claims about the people using it.
We also need departments to distinguish capability from safeguards.
Sometimes the response to a surveillance concern is: Our policy prohibits that.
That is useful information.
Then residents may reasonably ask:
Can the technology still do it?
Is the capability disabled?
Or is it available but prohibited by policy?
Those are different risk models.
If you think we misunderstand something, talk to us.
We welcome factual information from patrol officers, detectives, command staff, dispatchers, crime analysts, municipal attorneys, IT personnel, elected officials and other public-safety professionals.
That does not mean private or restricted information should be sent improperly. Please follow your legal and professional obligations.
But public records, public policies, technical corrections and legitimate explanations are welcome.
We will ask difficult questions.
Respect does not mean avoiding disagreement.
We will still ask:
Who can access the data?
How broadly can it be searched?
What does it cost?
How often is it genuinely useful?
What mistakes occur?
How are audit logs reviewed?
What outside agencies have access?
What happens when the contract ends?
What alternative investigative methods exist?
And:
Why should ordinary residents have their movements recorded in order to make investigations easier?
Those are legitimate questions.
We hope you will ask difficult questions too.
Police professionals evaluating surveillance technology can ask vendors:
- What happens when the system is wrong?
- How are sharing errors detected?
- What new capabilities can be activated through software?
- How are sensitive searches audited?
- How can access be restricted technically rather than only by policy?
- What happens to data when the contract ends?
- Which effectiveness claims have been independently validated?
- How much does the department actually depend on this tool?
Internal skepticism is healthy too.
We agree on more than the argument sometimes suggests.
Most people involved in this debate probably want serious crimes investigated, victims helped, stolen property recovered, dangerous people identified, officers kept safe, false accusations avoided, government power used responsibly and communities that trust their institutions.
The disagreement is about whether mass vehicle-location collection is an acceptable way to pursue those goals.
That is a real disagreement.
It does not require hostility.
If the cameras come down, police work continues.
Departments investigated crimes before large networked ALPR systems.
They can investigate crimes afterward.
Methods may change. Some cases may become less convenient. Other investigative approaches may receive more attention.
That is what happens whenever a community sets limits on government power.
The question is not whether removal has zero effect.
The question is whether the surveillance capability is justified.
We believe it is not.
Our request
If you work in public safety, read our evidence, challenge anything that is inaccurate, tell us what we are missing, explain what you think residents should understand and hear our concerns in the same spirit.
You may never agree with our conclusion.
That is fine.
We can still have a factual, civil conversation about what powers our communities should give government.
We oppose the system.
We do not need to make enemies out of the people who use it.
Do ALPRs Work? What the Evidence Actually Says →